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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In response to Mr. Mendiola's assertions on appeal in support of his claim that 
the district court erred when it dismissed his post-conviction petition, the State has 
claimed that: (1) one of Mr. Mendiola's claims was not properly justiciable in post- 
conviction proceedings because it could have been raised on direct appeal; (2) 
Mr. Mendiola failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea 
was coerced; and (3) Mr. Mendiola failed to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence his post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. This Reply 
Brief is necessary to address the State's contentions. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mendiola's petition for post-conviction relief 
in light of the numerous erroneous factual findings and legal errors that, cumulatively 
and individually, demonstrate that the district court failed to properly adjudicate 
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mendiola's Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief In Liqht Of The Numerous Erroneous Factual Findinns And Leqal Errors That, 
Cumulativelv And Individually, Demonstrate That The District Court Failed To Properly 
Adiudicate Mr. Mendiola's Post-Conviction Claims 
A. Mr. Mendiola's Assertion That The District Court Erred When It Failed To 
Ascertain Whether There Was A Stronq Factual Basis To Support His Alford Plea 
Of Guilty Was Properlv Presented In His Post-Conviction Petition 
The State has suggested on appeal that Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claims 
regarding the failure of the district court to ascertain a factual basis in support of his 
~ l fo rd '  plea were procedurally barred and, therefore, the district court did not err in 
dismissing Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition with regard to this issue 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-9.) This argument is made in reliance upon I.C. § 19-4901(b), 
which provides in pertinent part that any issue that could have been raised in direct 
appeal, but was not, is generally forfeited in post-conviction. I.C. § 19-4901(b) (see also 
Respondent's Brief, pp.5-9.) While acknowledging the case law that has repeatedly 
found that a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea is cognizable in post-conviction, the 
State nevertheless urges this Court to find that, in Mr. Mendiola's case, a different set of 
rules should apply. 
What is not acknowledged in the Respondent's Brief is clear and dispositive 
language from the case law cited by the State that governs exactly the type of challenge 
that Mr. Mendiola raised in his post-conviction petition with regard to the validity of his 
Alford plea. A defendant may raise a challenge to the validity of his or her guilty plea for 
the first time in a petition for post-conviction relief because these claims are a request, 
' See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
"to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect either the jurisdiction of the 
court or the validity of the judgment, even though these errors could have been raised 
on appeal." Ricca v. Sfafe, 124 ldaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App.1993) 
(quoting Maxfield v. State, 108 ldaho 493, 499, 700 P.2d 115, 121 (Ct. App. 1985)) 
(emphasis added). As further noted by the ldaho Court of Appeals in Nellsch v. Sfafe, a 
defendant's failure to appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence based upon 
alleged deficiencies in the taking of his or her plea, "does not bar these claims from 
being heard on a petition for post-conviction relief." Nellsch v. Sfafe, 122 ldaho 426, 
430, 835 P.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1992). 
The sum and substance of the State's procedural argument is that 
Mr. Mendiola's claims regarding the failure to establish a factual basis for his plea could 
have been raised through a direct appeal, and therefore his case is distinguishable from 
the numerous cases that have deemed such a claim to be cognizable in post-conviction. 
However, the very cases relied upon by the State expressly provide that such claims 
are cognizable even if the assertion could have been raised on appeal. Given this, the 
State's contention is without support in law. 
Further, the district court elaborated on additional reasons, beyond the fact that 
case law established the justiciability of Mr. Mendiola's claims, for granting an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether a factual basis was established for 
Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea. First, the district court noted that, if I.C. § 19-4901 was 
interpreted in the way advocated by the State, both before the district court and now on 
appeal, many claims (such as ineffective assistance of counsel) would not be 
reviewable at all through post conviction, and that this was clearly not what was 
intended by the legislature. (R., pp.151-152.) Moreover, the district court found that it 
was possible that Mr. Mendiola could be better able to develop his claims in post- 
conviction through presentation of his trial counsel's testimony or other evidence. 
(R., p.152.) Finally, the district court determined that an evidentiary hearing was 
appropriate on this issue in light of concerns for judicial economy and prevention of 
collateral proceedings with regard to this issue. (R., pp.152-153.) 
It is also worth noting that the State has asserted in a parenthetical that the ldaho 
Court of Appeals in Simons v. State suggested that a claim in post-conviction regarding 
the lack of a factual basis in support of a plea "might have been barred by I.C. § 19- 
4901(b)." (Respondent's Brief, p.8 n.2.) However, upon review of the portion of the 
opinion from which the State cites this language, it is apparent that the Simons Court 
was referring to a different issue than the question of whether the district court erred 
when it failed to establish the factual basis for the defendant's plea. See Simons v. 
State, 116 ldaho 69, 71, 773 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The defendant in Simons raised three issues for appellate review regarding her 
post-conviction petition: (1) whether she was charged under the wrong statute and 
should have been charged with vehicular manslaughter rather than voluntary 
manslaughter; (2) whether her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter was supported by 
an adequate factual basis; and (3) whether her sentence was excessive and should 
have been reduced. Simons, 116 ldaho at 70-71, 773 P.2d at 11 57-1 158. And the 
Simons Court addressed each of these issues in the order presented. The portion of 
the Simons Opinion cited to by the State was specific to the first issue - whether the 
defendant in Simons should have been charged with vehicular manslaughter rather than 
voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 71, 773 P.2d at 1158. But there is no such language, or 
indication of a similar concern, regarding the claim in Simons that the district court erred 
in failing to ascertain the factual basis for the defendant's plea. Id. at 76, 773 P.2d at 
1 I 63.2 
Finally, the State's assertion that Mr. Mendiola's claim regarding the district 
court's failure to establish a factual basis for his Alford plea was entirely dependant on 
matters contained within the underlying criminal proceedings is inaccurate, as the State 
ignores the testimony that was presented by Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel, John Adams, 
in support of this claim. (Tr., p.36, L.22 - p.37, L.9.) The State, in seeking summary 
disposition on this claim, asserted that "Petitioner's counsel stipulated that the transcript 
of the grand jury proceeding established probable cause for the charge to which the 
petitioner was pleading guilty," and then extrapolated this stipulation to extend to the 
factual basis for the plea itself. (R., p.124.) It was only through the evidentiary hearing 
held regarding Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition that Mr. Mendiola was able to 
expand the record so that his attorney could clarify, through his testimony, that the 
stipulation made at Mr. Mendiola's change-of-plea hearing was much more limited than 
the State claimed. When asked specifically whether he had stipulated to the factual 
basis for the plea, Mr. Adams responded: 
This Court may also wish to note that, as one of the reasons provided in support of 
entertaining the merits of the defendant's claim regarding being charged under the 
wrong statute, the Simons Court cited favorably to considerations that the district court 
was motivated to entertain the claim out of concerns of administrative efficiency and 
avoidance of collateral proceedings. Simons, 116 Idaho at 71, 773 P.2d at 1158. 
These grounds are very similar to those cited to by the district court in favor of granting 
an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition. (R., pp.151-153.) 
That's incorrect. I stipulated that the grand jury transcript provided 
probable cause for the filing of an Amended Information or an Amended 
Indictment. I never stipulated to a factual basis. 
Tr., p.37, Ls.6-9.) 
To the extent that the parties disputed whether trial counsel at the change of plea 
hearing had actually conceded that the grand jury transcript formed the factual basis for 
Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea, the testimony provided by Mr. Adams, which was only made 
in accordance with the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition, 
provided material evidence on this issue outside of the record in the underlying criminal 
proceedings that could not have been presented on direct appeal. In light of this, the 
State's claim that Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition did not present new or 
additional evidence regarding his challenge to the validity of his Alford plea is belied by 
the record of the proceedings in this case. (See Respondent's Brief, p.6.) 
The State has further asserted, albeit within a footnote in its Respondent's Brief, 
that, should this Court entertain the merits of Mr. Mendiola's claims regarding the district 
court's failure to ascertain a factual basis in support of his Alford plea, "Mendiola has 
failed to show error by the district court." (Respondent's Brief, p.5 n.1.) However, the 
State provides no analysis or authority in support of this blanket assertion. The 
Respondent's contentions on appeal must be supported with the reasons in support of 
the contentions and citation to "the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and 
record relied upon" in order to be properly presented on appeal. See I.A.R. 35(b)(6); 
see also State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). The State has 
failed to provide any argument or authority to support its claim. 
B.  Mr. Mendiola May Challenae, On Direct Appeal. Whether The District Court's 
Credibilitv Determinations Were Supported Bv Substantial And Comeetent 
Evidence. As The District Court's Credibilitv Determinations Are Factual Findinas 
That Are Material To The Underlying Adiudication Of The Legal Merits Of 
Mr. Mendiola's Case And Are Reviewable By This Court For Whether These 
Findings Were Clearlv Erroneous 
Mr. Mendiola has also challenged some of the district court's credibility 
determinations as being clearly erroneous in light of the absence of any evidence to 
support these .factual findings. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-28.) The State's sole response 
to this claim is contained within a footnote, in which the State characterizes 
Mr. Mendiola's argument as "specious," and cites to two cases, but does not set forth 
any analysis specific to the substance of Mr. Mendiola's claims. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.13 n.3.) 
As has been noted, the State's arguments on appeal must be supported with the 
reasons in support of the contentions and citation to "the authorities, statutes and parts 
of the transcript and record relied upon" in order to be properly presented on appeal. 
See I.A.R. 35(b)(6); see also State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996). While the State has cited to case law in its footnote, the State has not provided 
any argumentation or analysis as to how it is that these cases are pertinent to this 
Court's resolution of the issues on appeal or how these cases would support the bald 
claim that Mr. Mendiola's arguments are "specious." (Respondent's Brief, p.13 n.3.) 
In addition, the State's reliance on State v. Perry is misplaced, as this case only 
stands for the proposition that determinations of credibility are to be made by the initial 
fact-finder in a criminal case, and that an appellate court cannot conduct its own de 
novo reweighing of credibility. See State v. Perry, 139 ldaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 
1235 (2003). In other words, a party on appeal may not request that an appellate court 
make its own credibility determinations as a substitute for the determinations already 
made by the jury.3 
However, this does not mean that credibility determinations made by the district 
court as part of its fact-finding process in adjudicating a post-conviction petition are 
entirely insulated from any appellate review. In a civil proceeding that is tried to the 
district court, where the district court makes an express finding of credibility and then 
applies that factual finding to its legal conclusions, this constitutes a factual finding that 
is reviewable on appeal for whether the determination is clearly erroneous. Stuart v. 
State, 127 ldaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); see also Electrical Wholesale 
Supply Co. Inc. v. Neilson, 136 ldaho 814, 41 P.3d 242, 250 (2001) (appellate court 
generally does not second-guess the trial court's credibility determinations "unless they 
are unsupported by the evidence in the record," and reviewing the district court's 
credibility determination for whether it was supported by substantial and competent 
evidence); I.R.C.P. 52(a). While this Court gives deference to such credibility 
determinations, these findings are not exempt from appellate review and may be 
disregarded when the credibility determination is not supported by the evidence in the 
record. Id. 
Mr. Mendiola has challenged the district court's credibility determinations, which 
were relied on throughout the district court's legal conclusions in this case, as being 
without support in the evidence. He has not requested that this Court itself make new 
The other case cited by the State, Mitchell v. State, is relied upon merely for the 
premise that factual findings are reviewed for whether the finding is clearly erroneous. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998); (see also 
Respondent's Brief, p.13 n.3). This is identical to the standard articulated and argued in 
Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-21, 24-28.) 
credibility determinations to supplant those of the district court, but merely seeks review 
of whether the credibility determinations made by the district court were supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. Pertinent case law establishes that this is a 
proper challenge to the district court's underlying findings regarding credibility, and the 
State has presented this Court with no reasoned analysis to refute Mr. Mendiola's 
claims. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mendiola Relief On 
His Post-Conviction Claim That His Guilty Plea Was lnvoluntarv In Light Of The 
State's Threats To Prosecute Mr. Mendiola's Sisters And Seek Greater Charaes 
Aaainst Mr. Mendiola's Brothers Unless He Pleaded Guilty 
In response to Mr. Mendiola's assertion that his guilty plea was involuntary, as it 
was predicated entirely on the State's threat to prosecute his sisters, brothers, and 
brother-in-law, the State focuses its entire argument on only one factor of the overall 
considerations regarding whether the package plea deal was proper: whether the 
threatened prosecution of Mr. Mendiola's family members was brought in good faith. 
However, the analysis of whether a plea was entered voluntarily does not rest on any 
one factor and there are additional standards that govern the entry of such pleas that 
were not met in Mr. Mendiola's case. Additionally, the State's arguments regarding 
whether the State could have presented charges in good faith against Mr. Mendiola's 
sisters are erroneous. 
From the State's analysis, it would appear that the State believes that the 
existence of bad faith of the prosecution is an essential element of Mr. Mendiola's claim 
that his guilty plea was coerced due to the fact that it was the product of the State's 
threat to prosecute all of Mr. Mendiola's brothers and sisters if he did not so plead. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.13.) It is not an element. Whether there was a good faith basis 
to support the charges threatened against third parties is merely one factor that has 
bearing on the overall determination of the voluntariness of a package plea agreement. 
In re lbarra, 666 P.2d 980, 986-987 (Cal. 1983) (overruled on other grounds by 
People v. Mosby, 92 P.3d 841 (Cal. 2004)). The analysis of whether a package plea 
agreement resulted in a guilty plea that was coerced and therefore not voluntary is not 
subject to bright-line rules, but rather turns on the specific facts and circumstances of a 
particular case. State v. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho 530, 537, 21 1 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 
2008); Mafa v. Stafe, 124 ldaho 588, 594, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259 (Ct. App. 1993); Ibarra, 
666 P.2d at 986. 
In particular, the proper enquiry is whether "an innocent person would have felt 
compelled to plead guilty" in light of the circumstances that induced the plea. Id. As 
has previously been argued in Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief, he has met this 
standard by a preponderance of the evidence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-34, 36-38.) Of 
particular note is the fact that the State's threatened prosecution in this case was not 
merely of one member of Mr. Mendiola's immediate family, but of an entire generation 
of his immediate family - both of his brothers, both of his sisters, and his former brother- 
in-law. (R., p.60 at Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.7, L.20.) This fact alone separates Mr. Mendiola's 
case from those cases in ldaho that have found package plea agreements to be non- 
coercive. Given the depth and breadth of the outside force that was brought to bear on 
Mr. Mendiola, he has established by a preponderance of the evidence under the record 
in this case that in light of these circumstances, an innocent person likely would have 
felt compelled to plead guilty. 
What is further especially troubling, and would on its own justify permitting 
Mr. Mendiola to withdraw his plea, is the fact that the district court failed to take any 
special care in exploring the potential coercive impact of the threatened prosecutions on 
Mr. Mendiola's decision to plead guilty, despite being aware of the package plea 
agreement. A central requirement with regard to package plea agreements, given the 
"inherent dangers related to such third-party negotiations," is that the district court at the 
change-of-plea hearing use special care and employ close scrutiny to the details of 
such agreements and the potential coercive impact upon the defendant. See Mata v. 
State, 124 ldaho 588, 594-595, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259-1260 (Ct. App. 1993); see also 
State V. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 540, 211 P.3d 775, 785 (Ct. App. 2008) (J. 
Schwartzman, concurring). 
The coercive forces that may be at work in package plea agreement cases 
require unique care because such cases often bring into play pressures upon a 
defendant which are not related to the case, such as the desire to spare a family 
member from threatened prosecution or otherwise secure to another more lenient 
treatment. See Ibarra, 666 P.2d at 986. "The voluntariness of a plea bargain which 
contemplates special concessions to another - especially a sibling or a loved one - 
bears particular scrutiny by a trial or reviewing court conscious of the psychological 
pressures upon an accused such a situation creates." Id. at 987. As has been noted in 
the Appellant's Brief, and is undisputed by the State on appeal, this requisite searching 
enquiry never occurred. (Appellant's Brief, pp.30-32, 36-37.) 
The good faith of the threatened prosecution of family members or other third 
persons is certainly a condition precedent to a finding that a package plea deal is not 
coercive. See U.S. V. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5ith Cir. 1979). This is because, in 
absence of probable cause to believe that the third party has committed a crime, 
offering to forego prosecution of that person as a concession to the defendant 
"constitutes a species of fraud." Id. As such, a guilty plea that is induced by the 
promise not to charge a third party, where there is no good faith basis to bring such a 
charge, invalidates a guilty plea outright. Id. 
In this case, Mr. Mendiola did dispute the good faith basis for the threatened 
charges against Mr. Mendiola's sisters. With regard to the State's argument that the 
threatened prosecutions of Mr. Mendiola's brothers were made in good faith, 
Mr. Mendiola noted that no indictments were ever obtained against his sisters, who 
were part of the package plea deal in Mr. Mendiola's case. (R., pp.122, 132, 134, 173- 
174, 176.) 
The State, in turn, made no effort before the district court to refute Mr. Mendiola's 
assertions that the threatened prosecution of his sisters was not made in good faith - 
the State's sole argument was that there was probable cause to support charges 
against his brothers and brother-in-law. (R., p.122.) This Court may also wish to note 
that, in order for there to have been any good faith. basis to charge Mr. Mendiola's 
sisters as accessories after the fact of his alleged offense, the State would have to have 
a basis to establish that his sisters knew that a felony had been committed and either 
willfully concealed information from the police or harbored and protected their brother 
from the law. See I.C. § 18-205. By the district court's own findings, the only evidence 
relating to Mr. Mendiola's sisters was that the alleged victim's car was driven to their 
residence and Mr. Mendiola stayed with his sisters briefly following his alleged crime. 
(R., pp.268-269.) Nothing in this evidence supports any probable cause to believe that 
Mr. Mendiola's sisters had any pertinent knowledge of the offense he was alleged to 
have committed, nor that they willfully concealed any information or intended to harbor 
their brother from the police. 
Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Mr. Mendiola has 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea was coerced - i.e. 
that an innocent person would have felt compelled to plead guilty in like circumstances 
- and therefore his plea was invalid. 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mendiola Relief On 
His Post-Conviction Claim That His Attornev Was ineffective For Failins To 
Challenge The Lack Of A Sufficient Factual Basis To Support Mr. Mendiola's 
Alford Plea 
In response to Mr. Mendiola's assertion that the district court erred in denying 
Mr. Mendiola post-conviction relief based upon his assertion that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the lack of a factual basis to support his Alford plea, 
the State asserts that the grand jury transcript, which was not reviewed by the district 
court at the time of accepting Mr. Mendiola's plea, provided the factual basis. In making 
this claim, the State relies primarily on two cases to sustain its position: State v. 
Ramirez, 722 ldaho 830, 839 P.2d 1244 (Ct. App. 1992) and Fowler v. State, 109 Idaho 
1002, 712 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1985). (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-16.) However, a 
review of these cases reveals that they do not, in fact, support the State's contentions 
on appeal. 
From the outset, the State repeatedly cites to one particular passage in Ramirez, 
but apparently fails to give effect to the second portion of the passage cited. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.13, 15, 16.) The State quotes the following language from 
Ramirez in support of its claim that the district court could rely on a grand jury transcript 
that was not reviewed by the court at the time of taking an Alford plea of guilty to find a 
factual basis in support of such a plea: "In determining whether a factual basis for a 
guilty plea exists, we look to the entire record before the trial judge at the time the plea 
was accepted." Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248. The critical language in 
this passage, however, is found in the last clause of the sentence. This Court looks to, 
"the entire record before the trial judge at the time the plea was accepted." Id. By its 
very terms, this limits review of the information in support of a guilty plea to that which is 
actually considered by the district court at the time of taking the plea. 
This point is made more clear by the very next sentences in the paragraph from 
which the State has lifted the quoted language from Ramirez. The Ramirez Court 
continues: 
In this case the trial judge who accepted Ramirez's plea was not the same 
judge who presided over the preliminary hearing, and there is no 
indication that the trial judge obtained or reviewed a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing. However, based solely on the information 
ascertained by the trial judge at the change of plea hearing, we conclude 
that the judge did ascertain that there was a strong factual basis for the 
plea, and that Ramirez did enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily. 
Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248. By its very terms, and as has previously 
been noted in the Appellant's Brief, the Ramirez Opinion actually supports 
Mr. Mendiola's argument that the factual basis in support of an Alford plea can only be 
determined by that evidence that was ascertained by the district court as the basis in 
support of the Alford plea at the time the plea was taken. (Appellant's Brief, pp.34-35.) 
The second case primarily relied upon by the State, Fowler, likewise does not 
provide support for the State's position and, in fact, support's Mr. Mendiola's 
contentions in this case. From the outset, it does not appear from the case in Fowler 
that the defendant entered an Alford plea to the underlying offense. Fowler, 109 ldaho 
at 1003, 712 P.2d 704. This alone makes the holding in Fowler inapposite, as it is 
generally only in the context of an Alford plea that the district court is required to 
establish a factual basis for the plea at the time the plea is taken. See Rarnirez, 122 
ldaho at 834, 839 P.2d at 1248; Odorn v. State, 121 ldaho 625, 627, 826 P.2d 1337, 
1339 (Ct. App. 1992). 
While the Fowler Court did look to information contained within the defendant's 
presentence investigation report, generated after the defendant entered his guilty plea, 
io  support the factual basis for the defendant's plea, the Fowler Court did so because it 
was confronted with a different type of challenge than that raised by Mr. Mendiola. The 
defendant in Fowler contended that "the statement in his presentence report concerning 
his lack of intent to steal from the restaurant created a duty of the district court - at the 
time of sentencing - to inquire into the factual basis for the plea." Fowler, 109 ldaho at 
1005, 712 P.2d at 706 (emphasis added). 
This challenge was rooted in a separate line of authority for when the duty to 
establish a factual basis for a plea may be triggered: that being where, after a plea is 
entered but before sentence is imposed, a trial court receives information raising an 
obvious doubt as to whether the defendant is in fact guilty. Id. (quoting Schmidt v. 
State, 103 ldaho 340, 345, 647 P.2d 796, 801 (Ct. App. 1982)). And the standards for 
such a challenge mirror those for when the challenge is appropriately raised for the 
failure to establish a factual basis at the time of taking a plea -the Fowler Court limited 
its review of the record to only that information that was before the district court at the 
time of sentencing. Id. Because the defendant in Fowler asserted that the information 
contained in his presentence investigation report raised an obvious doubt as to his guilt 
at fhe time of  sentencing, and because the district court had reviewed that information 
at the time of sentencing, the Fowler Court included these materials in its review of 
whether the district court had a sufficient factual basis to support the defendant's plea. 
Id. 
One further clarification is also necessary on this point. In its Respondent's Brief, 
the State asserts, inter alia, that Mr. Mendiola has not argued that the grand jury 
transcript fails to provide a factual basis for his Alford plea. (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) 
In fact, Mr. Mendiola makes a lengthy challenge to the district court's finding that the 
grand jury proceedings could be used to establish the factual basis for his guilty plea. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.21-24, 34-35.) Mr. Mendiola has asserted that the district court's 
finding that it could use the grand jury transcripts to establish the factual basis for his 
plea was erroneous because: (1) he had never stipulated that the grand jury transcript 
provided a factual basis to support his plea, contrary to the finding of the district court; 
and (2) this transcript was not actually reviewed by the district court at the time 
Mr. Mendiola's plea was taken. (Appellant's Brief, pp.21-24, 24-25.) As such, 
Mr. Mendiola has asserted that the district court erred when it used the grand jury 
transcripts to establish the factual basis for his Alford plea. 
Here, the district court admitted at the time Mr. Mendiola had entered his guilty 
plea that it had never reviewed the contents of the grand jury transcripts at the time the 
district court accepted Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea. As such, this information was not 
part of the factual basis that was actually ascertained by the district court at the time of 
accepting Mr. Mendiola's plea. There is no other evidence or basis proffered in the 
record in support of Mr. Mendiola's Alford plea. Given this, Mr. Mendiola has 
established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his attorney was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the absence of a factual basis in support of his plea. 
E. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mendiola Relief On 
His Post-Conviction Claim That His Attorney Was Ineffective For Failinct To 
Present Critical Mitictating Evidence At Sentencinq 
The State further asserts, with regard to Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction claim that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain pieces of mitigating 
evidence, that Mr. Mendiola, "never presented to the court the evidence he believed his 
counsel deficiently failed to present." (Respondent's Brief, p.17.) The evidence claimed 
to have been absent included the autopsy report and toxicology report performed on the 
alleged victim, as well as evidence that indicated that the alleged victim was known to 
carry a gun. 
However, these very materials were presented to the district court in conjunction 
with Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition. A post-conviction petition must present, or 
be accompanied by, admissible evidence in support of the petitioner's claims. See 
Sfafe v. Payne, 146 ldaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (emphasis added). The 
evidence that may be presented in support of a post-conviction petition can include 
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence. I.C. 3 19-4907(a). 
Mr. Mendiola acknowledges the ldaho Court of Appeals' holding in Loveland v. 
Sfafe that not all pieces of documentary evidence tendered in support of a post- 
conviction petition are automatically entered into evidence at an evidentiary hearing on 
that petition. Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751,754 (Ct. App. 2005). 
However, the facts in Mr. Mendiola's case are materially distinguishable from those in 
Loveland, and therefore, under the record in this case, the evidence at issue should be 
deemed to have been incorporated into the evidence. 
The defendant in Loveland had contended that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to abide by the defendant's request that counsel file a notice of appeal. Id. at 
935, 120 P.3d at 753. Mr. Loveland initially provided an affidavit in support of his claims 
in which he asserted that he had personally requested that his counsel file a notice of 
appeal, but that counsel failed to do so. Id. At the evidentiary hearing, when asked if 
the defendant would be presenting any evidence, the defendant indicated that he was 
relying solely on the underlying criminal record and two transcripts of proceedings. Id. 
The defendant then went a step further and disavowed any other evidence, stating, 
"And I don't intend to rely upon any other facts other than what are in those transcripts, 
Judge." Id. It was within this factual context that the Loveland Court concluded that the 
defendant had declined to present any evidence in support of his post-conviction claims. 
Id. 
Here, Mr. Mendiola made no such disavowal, and both he and the State 
incorporated the evidence presented in conjunction with Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction 
petition into their arguments after the evidentiary hearing in this case. Mr. Mendiola 
accompanied his post-conviction petition with admissible evidence that was attached to 
his post-conviction petition and also incorporated those materials into his petition by 
reference. (R., p.56.) These materials were further discussed during the testimony of 
Mr. Mendiola's trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p.19, L.12 - p.20, L . l l ;  
p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.9.) In addition, Mr. Mendiola also incorporated these materials into 
his briefing and argument after the evidentiary hearing regarding the issue of whether 
his trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to present these pieces of 
evidence to the district court at sentencing. (R., pp.180, 231 .) This evidence was also 
discussed by the State in its post-evidentiary hearing briefing. (R., p.215.) As such, it 
was clear that the parties contemplated that the exhibits provided in support of 
Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition would be incorporated as evidence even after an 
evidentiary hearing was granted. 
Mr. Mendiola presented in his post-conviction petition, as evidence, the sworn 
affidavit of Mr. Garcia. (R., pp.82-84.) Mr. Garcia was present at the day that Mr. Butler 
was killed, and heard Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola arguing. (R., p.83.) He further 
averred that Mr. Mendiola had stated that Mr. Butler had pulled a gun, and that, "In the 
past, I had seen Brendan [Butler] with a gun." (R., p.84.) Therefore, Mr. Mendiola did 
present evidence to the district court in support of his post-conviction petition that 
Mr. Butler was known to carry a gun in the past. 
Mr. Mendiola also presented the autopsy report and the toxicology report 
performed on Mr. Butler as evidence in support of his post-conviction claims. 
(R., pp.85-95.) This autopsy report showed that Mr. Butler was on no less than three 
opoids - hydrocodone, hydromorphone, and oxycodone - and also under the influence 
of marijuana at the time of his death. (R., p.85.) The toxicology report provides similar 
findings. (R., p.95.) As such, the State's assertion that Mr. Mendiola never presented 
this evidence to the district court is affirmatively refuted by the record. 
Moreover, the district court's disregard of the information presented in 
Mr. Garcia's affidavit tendered as evidence in support of Mr. Mendiola's petition for post- 
conviction relief was based partly upon the district court's action that was clearly 
improper - the district court taking judicial notice of its own memory of Mr. Garcia's 
statements at his own sentencing hearing when no transcript of these statements was 
ever produced. See Mafthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807-808,839 P.2d 1215, 1221- 
1222 (1 992). 
As previously noted in Mr. Mendiola's Appellant's Brief, trial counsel conceded 
that it was deficient performance, and further was not a strategic decision, for counsel to 
fail to present this evidence at sentencing. (Tr., p.20, Ls.16-20; p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.9) 
(see also Appellant's Brief, pp.40-42.) Further, Mr. Mendiola has established a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's admittedly deficient performance, the 
district court would have struck a different balance at sentencing, as the district court at 
sentencing was obviously quite concerned with the lack of evidence bearing on "the 
extent of malice" that accompanied the alleged killing. (R., p.73 at Tr., at Tr., p.25, L.1 - 
p.27, L.2; see also Appellant's Brief, pp.42-44.) 
It is also worth noting that, at the time of sentencing, the district court was under 
the erroneous belief that, "this wasn't a situation where someone under the influence of 
drugs suddenly freaked out and that's why this ensued." (R., p.73 at Tr., p.26, Ls.18- 
20.) Had the mitigating evidence of Mr. Garcia's statements regarding the sudden fight 
between Mr. Butler and Mr. Mendiola been presented to the district court, along with the 
autopsy and toxicology evidence showing that Mr. Butler had, in fact, been under the 
influence of four separate controlled substances at the time, the district court would 
have been made aware that this case quite likely presented just such a scenario. 
In sum, Mr. Mendiola's post-conviction petition was accompanied by admissible 
evidence in support of his claims regarding the failure of trial counsel to present 
mitigating evidence at sentencing. This evidence was expressly incorporated into the 
arguments of the parties following the evidentiary hearing in this case. The State's 
contention to the contrary is erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mendiola respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying post-conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings 
DATED this 1' day of June, 2010. 
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